Libya’s fossil fuel wealth has dominated its political economy and state institutions since the 1960s and paid for large-scale, centralized water and energy infrastructures. Since the 2011 revolution, these infrastructures have been at the center of Libya’s protracted conflict. Unlike other protracted conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa in which water and energy were directly and extensively targeted, we find that warring parties in Libya have largely not sought to destroy but rather control and disrupt Libya’s rentier state institutions. The oil and gas infrastructure, along with the National Oil Company and the central bank that processes oil revenues, are at the heart of elite rivalries over political authority. We find relatively infrequent attacks on centralized water infrastructures. The toll of protracted conflict on water-energy systems has been cumulative, with looting, lack of repair and investment, and departure of qualified personnel. We draw upon an original dataset, qualitative interviews with humanitarian actors, policymakers, and Libyan experts, and a review of extant literature to show how and when local communities, armed militias, former army units, and aspiring warlords sought to capture and leverage water and energy infrastructures. The article highlights the consequences of infrastructure targeting for broader human security.
